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Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto 
 
Much academic work continues to operate within the cramping and pervasive spirit of a 
black-letter mentality that encourages scholars and jurists to maintain legal study as an 
inward-looking and self-contained discipline. There is still a marked tendency to treat law 
as somehow a world of its own that is separate from the society within which it operates 
and purports to serve. This is a disheartening and disabling state of affairs. Accordingly, 
this article will offer both a critique of the present situation and suggest an alternative 
way of proceeding. The writer recommends a shift from philosophy to democracy so that 
legal academics will be less obsessed with abstraction and  formalism and more 
concerned with relevance and practicality. In contrast to the hubristic and occasionally 
mystical aspirations of mainstream scholars, it presents a more humble depiction of the 
worth and efficacy of the jurisprudential and scholarly project in which 'usefulness' is 
given pride of place. Of course, these fundamental charges are not applicable to all legal 
scholars. Many scholars are engaged in work that not only challenges the prevailing 
paradigm of legal scholarship, but also explores exciting new directions for legal study. It 
will be part of the essay to acknowledge those contributions. 
 
There are ghosts almost everywhere. The present is haunted by phantoms of what it 
might have been and what it still might become. It is difficult to do much without some 
spectral apparition or other hovering around. People spend much of their time either 
running away from the wraiths of some ghastly visions, past and future, or striving to 
live up to some ideal phantasms, redemptive and disabling. There seems to be no way 
to escape from the corporeal effects of these other-worldly spirits. And law and 
jurisprudence are no different. Indeed, they seem to have more than their fair share of 
chimeras and charismas with which to deal. Lawyers and jurists work under the 
influence of many shades. Whether it be the chilling admonitions of past judges or the 
ennobling praise of future jurists, law's ghosts inhabit and spook its daily rites and rituals. 
Looking over their shoulders, lawyers are constantly battling with ghosts of precedents 
past or, peering ahead, they are trying to glimpse premonitions of doctrines future. 
Legal scholarship is in thrall to a daunting series of spectral influences that hold great 
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sway over both the ambition and achievement of its most celebrated practitioners. In 
an important sense, jurisprudence -put simply, those efforts to step back from the actual 
practice and operation of law in order to make some general sense of it all is where such 
ghostly tendencies are most frequently sighted, often invoked and occasionally 
exorcised. 
In this essay, I want to do a little bit of my own ghost-busting. Much academic work 
continues to operate within the cramping and pervasive spirit of a blackletter mentality that 
encourages scholars and jurists to maintain legal study as an inward-looking and self-
contained discipline. There is still a marked tendency to treat law as somehow a world of its 
own that is separate from the society within which it operates and which it purports to serve. 
In a manner of speaking, the ghosts of Blackstone and Coke not only prowl the corridors of 
academe, but are welcome souls in its offices and classrooms. Although mainstream scholars 
feign a modesty and subservience, their work smacks of a hubris that is no less acceptable 
for its more humble presentation. This is a disheartening and disabling state of affairs. 
Accordingly, as an antidote to this malaise, I will offer both a critique of the present 
situation and suggest an alternative way of proceeding. In effect, I want to recommend a 
shift from philosophy to democracy so that legal academics will be less obsessed with 
abstraction and formalism and more concerned with relevance and practicality. Or, more 
jurisprudentially, I want to engender a mode of legal theory and scholarship that takes its 
lights less from analytical philosophy and more from democratic politics. In contrast to the 
hubristic and occasionally mystical aspirations of mainstream scholars, I will present a 
more humble depiction of the worth and efficacy of the jurisprudential and scholarly project 
in which 'usefulness' is given pride of place. As Richard Rorty recommends, there must be 
'a moratorium on theory' and those committed to reform, whether on the political right or left, 
'should try to kick the philosophy habit' and 'not let the abstractly decided best be the enemy of 
the better' .1  Indeed, I will rely substantially, although not uncritically, on Rorty's important 
work in my efforts to exorcise the familiar ghosts of legal study. 
As a helpful foil and illuminating trope, I will rely on George Eliot's Middlemarch. 
 
Viewed from a particular perspective, this feted novel captures wonderfully the plot and 
plight of modern legal scholarship. With a sweep that Tolstoy might have envied and a 
style that Hugo might have coveted, Eliot's celebrated work chronicles the struggles of a 
genteel, early nineteenth-century English society that is slowly being forced to confront the 
precious privilege of its established ways and to come to terms with the bracing challenge 
of democracy's fledgling forces. At the thematic heart of the novel is the short-lived and 
ill-fated marriage between the young reformer, Dorothea Brooke, and the ageing scholar, 
Edward Casaubon. In an early exchange between the two, Dorothea enthuses about one 
of her most cherished projects, to alleviate the condition of the poor by building cottages 
for those who worked on her uncle's estate: 'I think we deserve to be beaten out of our 
beautiful houses with a scourge of small cords all of us who let tenants live in such sties as 
we see round us. Life in cottages might be happier than ours, if they were real houses fit for 
human beings from whom we expect duties and affections.' Mr Casaubon's only response 
is to declare that he 'did not care about building cottages, and diverted the talk to the 
extremely narrow accommodation which was to be had in the dwellings of the ancient 
Egyptians as if to check a too high standard'.2 There is much in this brief exchange (and in 
Dorothea and Casaubon' s unhappy relation generally) that resonates with the contemporary 
engagement over the soul of law, legal scholarship and theorising. Reduced to its basic 
essentials, the point of disagreement between the reigning philosopher-kings of the legal 
establishment and their democratic critics is quite simple -the actual construction of cottages 
for the poor or detached ruminations on abstract points of ancient architecture? 
Of course, these fundamental charges are not applicable to all legal scholars. Many 
scholars are engaged in work that not only challenges the prevailing paradigm of legal 
scholarship, but also explores exciting new directions for legal study. It will be part of my 
essay to acknowledge those contributions. However, as rich and as vibrant as that literature 
is, it remains marginal and secondary to the dominant literature and, in an important sense, 
underlines the prevalence of the traditional model. Accordingly, I will first introduce the 
ghosts that haunt legal study and explain the extent to which they still influence and 
 
inform the contemporary scholarly agenda. In the next section, I explore some of the 
philosophical contexts within which these apparitions take hold and inhibit the 
jurisprudential intellect. Having outlined legal academe's predicament, the larger part of the 
essay is devoted to elaborating its critique and justifying an alternative approach. One 
section lays out the basic theoretical critique of legal theorists' tendency to abstraction and 
system-building and the next section traces the implicit politics of this manoeuvre. Then, I 
outline the basic thrust of a more useful jurisprudence. By way of conclusion, I distinguish 
and defend my own brand of radical pragmatism from that of other pragmatic critics. 
Although my target in this essay is the whole of legal scholarship, I will devote more time 
and attention to the jurisprudential phantoms that underlie and animate more routine 
performances of legal scholarship. Whether legal academics accept or appreciate it, their 
work is overshadowed by a few intellectual and daunting spectres. 
 
MEETING MR CASAUBON 
 
As much as George Eliot's Middlemarch can lay claim to being one of the most 
celebrated English novels, Mr Casaubon stands as a competitor for one of literature's great 
misanthropic characters. As a central figure in this sophisticated comedy of manners about 
English provincial life around the tumultuous years of the 1832 Reform Bill, when the old 
order was beginning to unravel, the Reverend Edward Casaubon was 'noted in the county as 
a man of profound learning' and whose 'very name carried an impressiveness hardly to be 
measured without a precise chronology of scholarship'. Piously devoted to researching and 
writing his life's work, A Key To All Mythologies, he was fond of telling people 'how he had 
undertaken to show (what indeed had been attempted before, but not with that thoroughness, 
justice of comparison, and effectiveness of arrangement at which Mr. Casaubon aimed) that 
all the mythical systems or erratic mythical fragments in the world were corruptions of a 
tradition originally revealed'. Moreover, although occasionally anguished by deep inward 
doubts, Casaubon was outwardly confident that, 'having once mastered the true position and 
 
taken a firm footing there, the vast field of mythical constructions [would become] 
intelligible, nay, luminous with the reflected light of correspondences'. In completing this 
monumental project, he was intent on not pandering to 'the facile conjectures of ignorant 
onlookers' nor gaining 'a temporary effect by a mirage of baseless opinion'. For Casaubon 
and other keepers of scholarship's true flame, 'it is ever the trial of the scrupulous explorer to 
be saluted with the impatient scorn of chatterers who attempt only the smallest achievements, 
being indeed equipped for no other'.3 
Although Casaubon died before completing his pantologic study (but not before he 
realised its futility), his ghost still stalks the academic groves of legal scholarship. 
Although often less pretentious or precious, the belief endures that it is possible to locate or 
fashion a conceptual key that will unlock the universal mysteries of law's historical 
existence. In Casaubonic style, jurists strive to reduce law's sprawling and contingent 
complexities to a simple and singular sense of order and coherence. Unable to resist 
the quasi-divinistic urge, as Holmes put it, to 'catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of 
its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law' ,4 the most common response is to 
identify some spectral dynamic at work that integrates the best efforts of lawyers and 
judges to develop the law justly in specific cases and the general system of norms that results. 
Within this philosophical account, law always manages to be more than the historical heap 
of its human-made parts: it has a qualitative dimension that transcends its quantitative 
mass. Judges and jurists are portrayed as being involved in the almost theological task of 
illuminating the transcendent wonders of human-made law with the intellectual lightning of 
jurisprudential insight. Like Casaubon, legal philosophers still tend to see themselves as 
'something like the ghost of an ancient, wondering about the world and trying mentally to 
construct it as it used to be, in spite of ruin and confusing changes' .5 
The Casaubonic influence is as strong and as baneful today as it has ever been. 
Jurisprudence remains in the hold of such a precious mentality from the most doctrinal of 
legal scholarship through to the most abstruse of legal theorising. In a sense, if 
Casaubon is the patron-ghost of philosophical purism, then Blackstone is his legal 
 
representative. Law is taught and written about within the pervasive shadow of the 
Blackstonian mind-set; this is 'black-letterism'. By this, I mean the tendency of lawyers to 
focus almost exclusively on material in a way that rarely gets beyond a taxonomic 
stock-taking. Originally a typographical term, 'black-letter law' was used to refer to 
rudimentary principles that were printed in boldface type in traditional law texts.6 However, 
it has come to designate an approach to law that claims to concentrate on narrow statements 
of what the law is and eschews resort to any extra-doctrinal considerations of policy or 
context: the textual formulation of the law is regnant and is treated as a world unto itself. 
In scholarly terms, the limited aim of black-letterism is to identify, analyse, organise 
and synthesis extant rules into a coherent and integrated whole; there is much talk of 
As and Bs in illustrative exegesis with almost no reference to political context or social 
identity. Criticism is largely confined to highlighting formal inconsistencies and rooting 
out logical error. This organisational function is seen as an end in itself with the 
corollary that any study of the social or political context in which those rules arise or 
have effect is considered, at best, to be someone else's jurisdiction, like the social 
scientist or political theorists; it is not so much that such work is unimportant, but that it 
is not a necessary part of the lawyer's learning or expertise. 
In undertaking such a black-letter task, the ambition of the scholar is to collate the 
available cases and materials and then whip recalcitrant areas into conceptual shape. At its 
most sophisticated, there is an insistence that the common law is much more than the sum 
of its precedential parts; the precedents are not the law, only evidence and illustrations of it. 
The informing assumption is that what the courts are doing is largely right: jurisprudence 
is 'rational science of general and extensive principles' and the common law is 'fraught 
with the accumulated wisdom the ages' .7 In short, it is taken for granted that legal 
doctrine is underpinned by an intelligible and just plan of social life such that the task of 
the legal scholar is to extend law in accordance with the plan so that it becomes less 
fragmentary and more intelligible. This tradition of black-letterism runs from Coke, 
Hale and Blackstone through Dicey, Pollock and Anson to Smith, Treitel and Beatson; it 
 
remains as alive and kicking as it ever has been. A cursory glance at the leading textbooks 
strongly supports such an assessment: Smith and Hogan's Criminal Law, Cheshire and 
Furmston' s Contract, and Winfield's Tort all speak to the narrow and precious approach to 
legal scholarship that dominates legal study. The ambition is to provide a comprehensive 
and systemic account of the law; any criticism is about discrete errors and particular 
mistakes rather than any systematic critique. Almost without exception, these authors 
tend to be male. For instance, Smith and Hogan offer a large tome which is purely about 
conceptual analysis whose main task is a descriptive account of the law and in which 
principled consistency within judgments, areas and between areas is the organising device. 
There is no contextual setting offered about crime or its informing forces, with readers 
being asked to 'judge for himself how far these [the stated purposes of criminal law] are 
fulfilled by English criminal law' .8 
This black-letter literature is not without its jurisprudential champions. Although 
black-letter law resists larger theoretical concerns and infiltrations, it has been defended in 
theoretical terms. In a wide-ranging essay, Peter Birks argues that traditional legal 
literature has played a massive role in the modem development of the common law and is 
the perfect theoretical complement to the common law's more casuistic practice. 
Defending the canon of legal literature, he acknowledges 'great academics' as much as 
great judges, lawyers and cases as the fixed points in the common law. By 'great', Birks is 
very clear that this is to be assessed by the extent to which a work contributes to 'the search 
for principle', rationally organises the case law, and is able to advance 'the magic of the 
common law' in its 'capacity to achieve sensitive pragmatic change without 
sacrificing structured rationality and predictability' .9 Accordingly, black-letter law is 
not simply the product of academic practitioners who are unable or cannot be bothered 
to engage in a broader and different intellectual exercise, but of those who undertake 
such a task as a matter of principle and pride. These scholars do not so much reject the 
Casaubonic influence as embrace it in a less grandiose and more focused incarnation. 
Nevertheless, modesty is no excuse and humility is no escape from the shortcomings 
 
of a full-blown Casaubonic exercise. And it is such a full-blown exercise that 
contemporary jurisprudence has become. 
Much contemporary jurisprudence is dismissive of black-letter scholarship; it is said to 
be too limited, unduly isolated and woefully inadequate. It is now conceded that law not 
only arises and results in social and political circumstances, but that social values and 
political morality play a vital role in the operation of the law. The major objective of 
much mainstream jurisprudence is to demonstrate that law is political, but that its politics 
are neutral in the sense of not being partisan or ideological.  However, while the tendency 
to talk about law in terms of politics and morality is now well entrenched in both legal 
theory and legal scholarship, it is still performed as an exercise in abstract analysis rather than 
engaged inquiry. The shift in scholarly attention has been less to political critique and more 
to philosophical analysis. However, this explicitly theoretical strain of legal scholarship 
criticises the textbook tradition from within the same disciplinary mind-set. Whatever its 
claims to the contrary, mainstream jurisprudence implicitly alleges that the ambition of 
black-letter scholarship is correct, but that its focus and execution are severely at fault. In 
a manner of speaking, jurists have dislodged black-letter law, only to replace it with 
blackletter theory: Casaubonic commitments have come out of the closet and become a 
celebrated ideal, not an embarrassing corollary of legal scholarship. 
 
 
A GHOSTLY PURSUIT 
 
Herbert Hart served the legal community of black-letter scholars well. His enlightened 
brand of legal positivism in The Concept of Law , with its analytical emphasis on rules, 
regularity and reasonableness, provided a jurisprudential support that enabled black-
letter writers to continue with their academic craft without too many qualms about the 
legitimacy or efficacy of their work. This is not surprising as Hart's avowed aim was to 
provide an essay in descriptive sociology in that he sought to make sense of lawyers' daily 
 
practices; he offered a commentary rather than critique.10 While this garnered obvious 
support among the adherents to a black-letter approach, it did little to convince sceptics or 
critics. Many jurists began to suggest that Hart's ideas ran out of steam at the very point that 
they were most needed; they had little to say about the resolution of hard cases where 
rules were unclear or clashed, other than that judges had a discretion and responsibility to do 
the best that they could. While this gave comfort to the critics (who tried to use this 
opening as a way to establish and further the claim that 'law is politics'), others were 
convinced that, while law is a system of rules, it is not only that -law is about values as 
much as it is about rules. Accordingly, a new generation of jurists began to develop a 
theory of law that took account of law as a thoroughly political enterprise, but somehow to 
do so in a way that was not itself political or ideological. In this effort, the Casaubonic 
impulse to abstract organisation and formal coherence proved irresistible. Modem 
jurisprudence has become increasingly philosophical and increasingly Casaubonic. 
Although this combination is far from inevitable and is best avoided (as I will shortly 
explain), its effects have been considerable for both the legal and jurisprudential project. 
Perhaps as a way to balance the excursion into the realm of values and morals, there was a 
felt need to become ever more abstract and formal in the hope that this would insulate the 
resulting theories from charges of partisanship. 
As traditionally understood, jurisprudence applies to all those efforts to step back from 
the actual practice and operation of law in order to make some general sense of it all. As 
Karl Llewellyn phrased it, 'jurisprudence is as big as law - and bigger' .11 This venture 
can be carried out from all manner of perspectives and indeed has been. Economists, 
sociologists, literary critics, anthropologists, political scientists, psychologists and many 
others have sought to place the world of law under closer critical scrutiny. However, in 
recent years, jurisprudence has been hijacked by philosophers. Apart from their usual 
imperialist claims about philosophy being the intellectual discipline that is assumed 
and incorporated by all others, legal philosophers claim to be first among 
jurisprudential equals. They insist that, while there is much of value to be learnt about law 
 
when viewed from the outside as a social or political activity, the effort to understand law in 
its own terms and as a viable internal operation is entitled to theoretical priority. It is not 
so much that they dismiss other types of study, but that they claim that they are of a 
secondary and derivative character to lawyers. While such jurists concede that not all 
problems and issues in law are philosophical, they do contend that all those problems and 
issues are capable of becoming philosophical ones and that they are premised on some 
inescapable philosophical assumptions. 
Construed in this way, jurisprudence soon found itself on the familiar terrain of many 
traditional philosophical conundrums and, in the process, has become dominated by 
philosophical preoccupations. Mindful of law's black-letter tradition and the challenge of 
maintaining democratic legitimacy for courts in a society in which important social 
questions are routinely left to judicial resolution, jurists have considered a central part of 
the jurisprudential project to develop an epistemology of law: How is it possible to have 
knowledge about law or to know what counts as knowledge of or about law? And what 
counts as good and bad knowledge about law? As such, jurisprudence has adopted a 
traditional and philosophical stance in developing a series of truth claims about the legal 
enterprise. All the problems of legal philosophy or jurisprudence have tended to begin and, 
in some cases, to end with this inquiry: 'most of the important arguments in legal thought 
are epistemological in nature.' 12 What begins as a preliminary condition for any 
jurisprudential progress or enlightenment to be made, soon becomes, once achieved, a way 
to underwrite the particular intervention as universally valid and, therefore, superior to all 
other offerings. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the jurisprudential attention to 
values has resulted in a tum away from the world rather than a return to it. Legal theorists 
have come to subscribe to a greater or lesser degree to the Casaubonic cause in which 
rigour, sweep, form, consistency and integrity are the watchwords. Matters of material or 
substantive justice are treated as distinctly secondary the actual construction of cottages for 
the poor or detached ruminations on abstract points of ancient architecture? Or, in more 
legallyrelevant terms, shelter for the homeless or consistency with the overarching 
 
principles of property law? 
Although this way of presenting the ambition and agenda of jurisprudence seems to 
speak in the mystical tones of bygone days, it remains the implicit mission and mind-set 
of modem jurisprudence. In the same way that Casaubon maintained that 'all the mythical 
systems or erratic mythical fragments in the world were corruptions of a tradition 
originally revealed', 13 mainstream jurists seem united in their belief that Law is more than 
the sum total of extant laws and decisions: it is felt to be both the expression and 
repository of a political insight that transcends the bounds of it-; temporary articulation. 
As such, it is generally agreed that democratic law-making cannot be left entirely to its 
own promptings, but must be judged by its willingness to conform to the dictates of a 
loftier discipline. Consequently, legal theorists strive to explain and justify the delicate 
(and elusive) relation between law's immanence the idea of law as the rational 
embodiment of an indwelling harmony -and law's instrumentality the practice of using law 
as an institutional tool for social engineering. In searching for that balance, the cool 
detachment of philosophical reflection is thought more conducive to democratic 
advancement than the heated contestability of popular debate. Despite the regular 
incantation of the Holmesian wisdom that 'the life of the law has not been logic, but 
experience', what counts as 'experience' is limited to law's own workings and 
lawyers' own wiles. Moreover, the jurisprudential examination of that experience is 
abstract and logical. One of the most enduring tropes about the nature of common 
law development is that it is constantly working on and through itself to satisfy better its own 
self-transforming ambitions. This assertion can be traced back over 250 years to the 
arguments of a young Solicitor-General, Mr Murray (later to become the legendary Lord 
Mansfield), in a relatively unimportant Chancery case about testimonial competence. 
Contending that the law moves generally from one particular occasion to another, he 
concluded that 'a statute very seldom can take in all cases, therefore the common law, that 
works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for that reason superior to 
an act of parliament'. 14 Always travelling, but never arriving, the common law is portrayed as 
 
continuing process which fulfils and refreshes itself from its own self-generated resources. 
This extravagantly Casaubonic trope is at the heart of two important and acclaimed 
contributions to modem jurisprudence. The first is the revival of a Kantian/Hegelian 
perspective on law and adjudication. For instance, Ernest Weinrib offers a supreme, if 
stylised, version of this retreat to philosophical purity. While his work is so much better 
and more serious than Casaubon could ever have anticipated or expected, it represents 
philosophical hubris writ large. Assuming the mantle of the True Philosopher, he 
brooks no dalliance with instrumental understandings; he makes an eloquent pledge of 
his unwavering affections and considerable energies to the revelation of law's 
neglected immanence. Rejecting less fundamentalist and formalist efforts 'to make sense 
of legal thinking and discourse in their own terms', Ernest Weinrib offers an 
Aristotelian account of law-as-justice-ensouled that defends and extols the objective 
truth of law's coherence and rationality. By attributing to law its own immanent theoretical 
intelligence that transcends and informs all its instrumental practical instances, Weinrib 
hopes to show that contemporary law is a deserving philosophical object of democratic 
allegiance precisely because the essence of law is its capacity to 'work itself pure' .15 His 
philosophical modus operandi is to proceed as if the challenge were to isolate certain 
insights, place them beyond the limitations of historical context and give them privileged 
status as knowledge on the basis of that relocation. Across Wei nrib' s modem enterprise, 
the flitting ghosts of Casaubonic thinking cast long and morbid shadows in whose 
halflight Weinrib visualises all kind of legal entities and philosophical ideas. Indeed, it is to 
this demi-monde that Weinrib urges fellow jurists to return if they are to maintain and 
complete the project of modem jurisprudence. However, this attempt to revive the 
dubious virtues of purism and scholasticism is ill-timed and unwarranted: it should be 
met with an equally thorough, sustained and unabashed exercise in ghost-busting. 
The other 'purist ' among the elite of modem jurisprudence is Ronald Dworkin. He has 
placed the notion that the law works itself pure at the dynamic core of his legal theory. Over 
three decades, Ronald Dworkin has developed a constructivist theory of law and 
 
adjudication at the heart of which is the naturalist insistence that 'law . . . is deeply and 
thoroughly political' .16 While this is promising, the bulk of Dworkin's writings disappoint. 
For him, the resort to politics is not about getting one's hands dirty in the messy world 
of real-life circumstances, but is about armchair philosophising in the rarified pursuit of 
law's inner intelligibility and principled purity. Championing the Blackstonian idea of law-
as-integrity and framing the courts as a privileged forum of principle, he lionises judges as 
princes of law's realm who are charged with the duty of applying and transforming the 
extant law in line with its own purer ambitions. In the Dworkinian Empire of Law, 
although these noble judges bear the brunt of that responsibility, they must leave it to 
philosophical 'seers and prophets 
. . . to work out law's ambitions for itself, the purer form of law within and beyond the law we 
have'. While such work and inspiration may elude rank-and-file lawyers, they are not left 
to their own devices, for their 'god is the adjudicative principle of integrity' which is a 
'more dynamic and radical standard than it first seemed, because it encourages a judge to be 
wide-ranging and imaginative in his search for coherence with fundamental principle' .17 
Accordingly, while Dworkin has obliged most legal scholars to concede that law is about 
values as much as rules, he has done so in a way that does not disturb the informing 
blackletterism that underpins the mainstream academic enterprise. Dworkin has made it safe 
for traditional scholars to talk about values and remain squarely with the formalised and 
abstract framework with which they are familiar. 
InDworkin, therefore, Casaubon has found his most sophisticated and modem adherent. 
Dworkin has managed to chastise the black-letter tradition of legal scholarship at the 
same time that he has taken it to more abstract heights. In his most recent work, Dworkin 
has not only held firm to these basic convictions, but he has confirmed them in the most 
unequivocal terms. In determining the correct legal answer to particular discrete legal 
problems, he maintains it is incumbent upon judges to have reflected upon the whole 
system of moral and legal principles that comprise a particular area of law and to grasp 
them in their most coherent and appealing presentation. Consequently, Dworkinian 
 
judges are obliged to take a 'theory-drenched' approach, even though they might well 
disagree over what that theory is and how it applies to the dispute at hand. As Dworkin 
expresses it: 
'A claim of law . . . is tantamount to the claim, then, that one principle or another 
provides a better justification of some part of legal practice. Better in what way? Better 
interpretively better, that is, because it fits the legal practice better, and puts it in a 
better light. Inthat case, any legal argument is vulnerable to what we might 
call justificatory ascent. When we raise our eyes a bit from the particular cases that seem 
most on point immediately, and look at neighbouring areas of the law, or maybe even 
raise our eyes quite a bit and look in general, say, to accident law more generally, or to 
constitutional law more generally, or to our assumptions about judicial competence or 
responsibility more generally, we may find a serious threat to our claim that the 
principle we were about to endorse allows us to see our legal practices in their best light.' 
18
 
For Dworkin, therefore, adjudication is less a technical craft and more a 
philosophical adventure of the grandest Casaubonic kind in which formal integrity 
and abstract coherence are both their tools and their goal. Nevertheless, Dworkin concedes 
that not every judge has the necessary Herculean philosophical wherewithal to 
undertake such an ambitious challenge. Whereas a mythical Herculean judge might be 
able to master the arcane equipment of philosophical sophistication, synthesise all the 
available historical material, construct a perfectly attuned and all-embracing structure, and 
apply it consistently to detailed legal problems, this is far beyond the competence of 
merely earthly beings. Instead, what is important is that judges should do the best that 
they can by being prepared to enter on the 'justificatory ascent' that might draw them into a 
more theoretical argument than they originally anticipated or wanted. Dworkin does not 
expect judges to make that 'justificatory ascent' as a matter of course, but he does remind 
judges and jurists that 'the ladder of theoretical ascent is always there, on the cards, even 
when no one is tempted to take even the first step up it' .19 Like Casaubon, therefore, 
 
Dworkin maintains that reflective height is the guarantor of moral depth. And, as 
Casaubon might put it, 'having once mastered the true position and taken a firm footing 
there, the vast field of [law] became intelligi ble, any, luminous with the reflected light 
of correspondences'. 20 At the very least within the Dworkinian scheme of things, formal 
consistency with the overarching principles of property law is as important as substantive 
shelter for the homeless. 
Of course, this Casaubonic style of legal philosophy has not gone unchallenged. It has come 
in for stem rebuke. Critics condemn such scholarly efforts in which jurists not only seem to 
believe that law has a supra-historical life, but that they can know and understand it. The 
idea that law is an immanent whole that transcends the accumulated sum of its 
immediate parts, that there is a simple metaphysical formula that explains all law or that 
legal practice can be rendered philosophically pure is increasingly untenable in a world in 
which lawyers and society at large are increasingly diverse in composition, interests and 
objectives. The claim that the best way to provide solid and secure footings for law and 
legal theory is by becoming more and more abstract and removed from its dayto-day 
operation is doubly mistaken. First, there are no solid and secure footings for law and legal 
theory that are not themselves part of the very political and situated debate that they are 
intended to ground and underwrite: there is no escape from the messy and contingent facts of 
social living. And, secondly, in so far as it is possible to think critically about law, it 
cannot be done by escaping the concrete circumstances of law and legal theorising: law is 
a practical enterprise and theory is a specialised form of practice. In the second half of this 




The legal careers of many such critics resemble George Eliot's feisty, but impressionable 
Dorothea Brooke. Initially infatuated by 'the set of his iron-gray hair and his deep eye-sockets 
[that] made him resemble the portrait of Locke' and awed by 'a modem Augustine whose 
 
work would reconcile complete knowledge with devoted piety', she saw Casaubon as 'a 
guide who would take her along the grandest path'. Furthermore, the thought that he might 
consent to be her husband filled her with 'a sort of reverential gratitude' 'Here was a man 
who could understand the higher inward life, with whom there could be some spiritual 
communion; any, who could illuminate principle with the widest knowledge: a man whose 
learning almost amounted to a proof of whatever he believed!' In that first flush of 
romance, she spent her days content 'to imagine how she would devote herself to Mr. 
Casaubon, and become wise and strong in his strength and wisdom'. There is much in 
Dorothea's condition that resembles young lawyers. While Dorothea came across her 
devotion through acculturation and inclination, law students are encouraged by institutional 
training and collective self-interest to cultivate such an awed and respectful posture towards the 
law and its intellectual, practising and judicial elite. Indeed, under the spell of a Casaubonic 
mind-set, the life of a law student is 'the mixed result of a young and noble impulse struggling 
amidst the conditions of an imperfect social state, in which great feelings will often take the 
aspect of error, and great faith the aspect of illusion' .21 
Yet Dorothea's selfless besottedness was unrealistic: no one could live up to such 
callow adulation, let alone the blighted Casaubon. Not surprisingly, Dorothea's 
admiration soon turned to disillusionment that quickly hardened to contempt, even if it 
later mellowed to pity. On her return from an ill-fated Italian honeymoon with Casaubon, 
she realised that even in her earliest and most scholarly devotions she had been 
'visited with conscientious questionings whether she were not exalting these poor 
doings above measure and contemplating them with that self-satisfaction which was 
the last doom of ignorance and folly'. As these questionings received ever more assured 
answers, she accepted that a life with Casaubon did not lead to 'large vistas and wide 
fresh air', but to 'ante-rooms and winding passages which seem to lead nowhither' and 
that 'her blooming full-pulsed youth stood there in moral imprisonment which made 
itself one with the chill, colourless, narrowed landscape'. Once Dorothea's anger and 
resentment had run their course, she looked upon Casaubon with a genuine mixture of 
 
sadness and compassion: 
'For my part, I am very sorry for him. It is an uneasy lot at best, to be what we call 
highly taught and yet not to enjoy: to be present at this great spectacle of life and never to 
be liberated from a small hungry shivering self never to be fully possessed by the glory 
we behold, never to have our consciousness rapturously transformed into the 
vividness of a thought, the ardour of a passion, the energy of an action, but always 
to be scholarly and uninspired, ambitious and timid, scrupulous and dim-sighted.' 22 
There is much in Dorothea's predicament that can be profitably related to the critics' 
reaction to contemporary mainstream jurisprudence. Instead of revelling in the full 
amplitude and unbuttoned possibilities of human existence, jurists bring to it a narrow 
and smothering perspective. Wanting to bring everything down to a dry and bloodless 
endeavour, they resemble taxidermists rather than naturalists; they want to capture and 
display legal wildlife in museums rather than marvel at their living colour and glorious 
vitality. Under their tutelage, jurisprudence is less about rapture and glory and more 
about rigour and scrupulousness. Although they present their work in grand and confident 
terms, contemporary jurists are fearful and desperate -they are fearful that, if the world of 
law and lawyers is not held in check, it will decline into a chaotic and arbitrary exercise and 
they are desperate because their efforts to establish such a checking device are increasingly 
less convincing. Rather than celebrate society's diversity and energy, they wish to leash 
and corral them. Accordingly, in its efforts to rescue law and lawyers from themselves, 
jurisprudence craves greater theoretical authority not only to bolster individual 
contributions, but also to salvage its own waning prestige. This characteristic Casaubonic 
mix of conceit and timidity is held together by an attachment to the idea that there are 
certain moral and legal facts-of-the-matter that transcend and discipline the beliefs of its 
participants about what the legal enterprise is and is not about. Maintaining that there 
are right methods that will produce right results, these jurists claim to speak in the 
authoritative accent of truth and objectivity. Yet, on closer inspection, these 
methodological claims are less the imprimaturs of a formalised justice, but more the earnest 
 
ways of simply getting-by. This is no bad thing. Stripped of their philosophical 
paraphernalia, these jurisprudential accounts might still have something to offer to law 
and its task of being substantively just in a world that is constantly shifting and changing. 
But it is this paraphernalia that must go. The insistence that the theoretical effort to 
distinguish between  'what the world seems like to us' and 'what the world really is' will 
pay practical dividends must be abandoned. There is no worthwhile or sustainable 
distinction between what is thought to be the case about the world and what is the case 
about the world, about what seems to be right and what is right, and between what is 
believed about the world and the way the world really is. Despite philosophers' and jurists' 
best efforts, it has not been possible to demonstrate that there is some critical distance 
between the world and our thoughts about it such that the world cannot only be what 
people think it is. To say something true and objective about the world is to do no more than 
report on what people presently believe or accept to be true and objective about the world. 
This is not deny that there is a reality or to fall into some absurdly solipsistic understanding 
of the world: it is simply to accept that there is no way of stepping outside our perceptions 
about the world to determine whether those perceptions correspond with what is really the 
case. The critical idea that a theory of truth is a theory of meaning and no more is offered as 
'an explanation of what people do, rather than of a non-causal, representing relation 
in which they stand to non-human entities' .23 There is no truth about what is really there 
over and above what are treated as the best prevailing beliefs about what is really there.  
And what is best is whatever has managed to get itself 
accepted in the relevant community of inquiry. 
Of course, many contemporary jurists do not insist that there are facts-of-the matter, such 
that what is the case or right is entirely independent of what is thought to be the case or 
right; so-called realists are few and far between. Instead, these 'constructivists' deny the 
existence of any moral facts as something independent of beliefs; they recognise that 
truths are as much chosen as they are perceived. Opting for an account that treats what 
people would think of as right under ideal conditions to determine what is in fact right, 
 
they have traded in notions of fundamental objectivity for more modest notions of 
constrained objectivity; what they lose in universality, they hope to gain in relevance and 
credibility. To achieve this more restrained fulfilment of the philosophical project, the most 
popular strategy has been to keep the truth-question separate from the reality-question by 
providing an account of truth and objectivity that does not depend on there being a 
correspondence between what is thought to be the case about the world and what is the 
case about the world. Denying the realists' insistence on moral facts-of-the-matter (or, at 
least, their accessibility to human demonstration), they recognise that truth is caught 
within the social web of language. But they go beyond the simplistic and uninteresting 
claims of correspondence theorists who deliver only empty tautologies about practice and 
objectivity. 24  Instead, they offer a coherence account of truth and objectivity in which it is 
maintained that the most convincing account is the one that shows how a complex structure of 
relationships can best cohere. This means that the truth of any particular moral judgment is 
dependent upon its coherence with all other moral intuitions and claims. In contrast to 
axiomatic or linear theories which establish first principles and then argue deducti vely 
from them to more detailed and particularised moral judgments, coherence accounts engage 
in a continual process of adjustment and revision between general moral principles and 
particular moral judgments until the most balanced and harmonised account is constructed.25 
Nevertheless, despite their constructivist claims, most philosophers still manage to 
utilise the realist heirlooms as part of modem theorising rather than shelve them as 
historical curiosities. Although they accept that what is thought to be the case is related to 
what is the case or that moral beliefs are relevant to moral facts-of-the-matter, they do not 
concede that there are no moral facts-of-the-matter; it is more a question of accessibility 
than actuality. The motivating fear is that, if the attempt to demand what is true and 
denounce what is false is abandoned, efforts to distinguish right and wrong will also be 
hopeless and all moral claims will be relativised; each opinion, no matter how quirky or 
perverse, will merit equal attention. In such circumstances, it is dreaded that morality will 
be reduced to a crude triumph of might over right or, at best, the tyranny of the majority. 
 
Accordingly, modem philosophers do not insist that it must be possible to demonstrate that a 
statement is true, only that it can be true or would be true under ideal conditions; the truth 
of a statement is not entirely reducible to or completely settled by reference to extant 
practice or the accumulation of prevailing beliefs. The tendency, therefore, is to offer 
largely constructivist accounts, but to insist that there are limits on that enterprise and to 
bound it by some strong and realist-grounded claims about morality. It is a tacit 
acknowledgment that coherence alone will not guarantee justice or fairness. Coherence 
only works as a guarantor of truth and objectivity where the general orientation of a set of 
practices is basically just. Whether apartheid or Nazism are wrong will not be determined 
by their greater or lesser compliance with the demands of coherence, but by their basic 
commitments and substantive consequences. Accordingly, the constructivist project rests 
on a foundational platform of realist assumptions. When coherence push comes to 
relativistic shove, most philosophers reassert their realist commitments by concluding that 
truth is something that can transcend what is believed to be the case there is more to truth 
than belief because, in important and critical circumstances, truth acts to discipline an 
incorrect belief, even though truth is never entirely independent of belief. 
It ought not to be surprising that jurisprudence has followed a similar course and 
reached a similar point in its development as philosophy generally. Cast as a particular 
comer of the philosophical action, jurists' efforts to understand law and adjudication have 
followed those of their more generalist colleagues. While there are still some dyed-in-the-
wool philosophical realists around and there is a flourishing, if contained, revival of 
axiomatic theories, 26 the predominant approach to legal theory is constructivist the task of 
providing a credible and workable account of legal truth and objectivity is achieved by 
developing the most coherent and compelling account of past legal practice. The most 
wellknown and successful proponent of such an approach is, of course, Ronald 
Dworkin; the influence of his work has been enormous in academe and, if less so, in the 
courts. This is not surprising, as he presents his jurisprudential theory as an account of what 
judges do as much as what they should do. Moreover, Dworkin's account is explicitly 
 
philosophical in orientation and elaboration. Although he offers an account that gives 
prominence to prevailing views and existing opinions, he insists that there are definite limits 
on the moral authority of such beliefs. For Dworkin, there are right answers to legal 
controversies, even if we disagree about what they are, and integrity's writ only runs as far 
as certain realist moral truths allow; 'the adjudicative principle of integrity [is not] 
absolutely sovereign over what judges must do at the end of the day . . . [because], if 
ajudge's own sense of justice condemned [a particular course of action], he would have 
to consider whether he should actually enforce it . . . or whether he should lie and say that it 
was not law after all, or whether he should resign'.27 For Dworkin, therefore, law is an 
epistemological undertaking of the most demanding and traditional kind: objectivity and 
truth are its watchwords and credentials. 
This minimally scaled-down project retains all the elements of a Casaubonic 
understanding of scholarly propriety and success. Jurists cannot seem to accept that 
justification is not about the abstract or special relation between ideas, but is a social 
practice that has or requires an external authority to its own contextual development: truth is 
no different from what passes as true. To insist that there is no distinction between 'what 
the world seems like to us' and 'what the world really is' is not itself offered as a 
metaphysical truth, but as a statement about the current state of play in the social enterprise 
of understanding the world. Any standards of assessment and validity are not external to 
and thereby controlling of debate, but are internal to the debate in that they inform it as 
much as they are changed by it. Epistemology fails in the sense that there is no privileged 
ground on which knowledge or meaning can claim to stand.  From an alternative pragmatic 
perspective, objectivity is about social agreement, whether imposed or assumed: it is 
not an approximation to some natural, neutral or noncontextualised standard of 
verification. As Richard Rorty, the most eloquent and cogent of the neo-pragmatists, 
puts it, 'explanatory power is where we find it' .28 Accordingly, theoretical inquiry ought to 
concern itselfless with the truth and objectivity of certain beliefs and more with the moral 
substance and practical implications of such beliefs. 
 
This tendency to abstract theorising has become a way to remain a spectator rather than 
a player at Dorothea's 'great spectacle of life'. Contemporary jurisprudence remains in 
the scholastic shadow of a Casaubonic need for scientific rigour and abstract 
detachment as if this was the key to unlock the normative secrets of the universe. The 
fact is that there are no normative secrets to the universe to be unlocked that are not the 
projections of our own ideals and desires. Contemporary jurists continue to waste valuable 
energies in this hapless pursuit; they have a lingering theological ambition in that they 
wishes to ascend to some super-human vantage-point what else is Hercules but a mythic 
and super-human alter ego of Dworkin himself? For instance, Dworkin wants us to make a 
'justificatory ascent' to some abstract remove from which we can catch an echo of the 
infinitely true and carry it back to society for people's edification and enlightenment the 
more recalcitrant the problem, the higher the ascent; the more entrenched the 
controversy, the more transcendent the escape; and the more convoluted the possibilities, 
the purer the ambition. Yet, contrary to the Casaubonic instinct for escape, progress is not 
about becoming more objective and true, about achieving justificatory height in order to 
attain moral depth, or about advancing towards some higher, more removed and 
abstract plane on which rationality can hold sway outside of the disabling influence of 
interests, commitments, fuzziness, history, culture and ideology. Despite traditional 
theorists' wishes and work to the contrary, there is no way to escape the politics of human 
finitude and transmigrate to an infinite realm of pure reason that secures people against the 
need to make difficult and always-contestable choices. Elegance, coherence and 
simplicity are valued attributes of any theory, but they are hollow and hopeless as ends in 
themselves; they must be subordinated to usefulness. Progress is about closing the gap 
between aspirations and actuality so that the world can become a better place. There is 
no epistemology that operates as something above rhetoric and there is no 
metaphysics that is something above rhetoric. Like debates about substance, there is 
nothing beyond persuasion among real people in real situations. Settled or fixed 
principles are simply those that have acquired and still manage to retain sufficient support 
 
in the political scheme of things; basic principles do not so much obviate the need for 
politics as provide a marker for them.29 The demand for integrity or consistency falls 
down because, at a suitable level of analysis, sometimes high and sometimes low, most 
things can be made to look more or less coherent. 
Accordingly, rather than commune with Casaubon and his juristic imitators about the 
common law working itself pure, it is more instructive to think about judges as engaged, 
through their own efforts and imagination, in the process of law simply 'working itself'. 
Indeed, despite its hubristic arguments and ambitions, modem jurisprudence manages to 
confirm the modest claim that the practices of law and philosophy are no more (and no less) 
than a human pursuit - situated, fragmentary, and flawed. Like all histories, the development 
of private law is best understood as a way of coping that is more or less successful in direct 
proportion to its capacity to achieve substantive justice in the contextual 
circumstances. Judges who make 'bad ' decisions do so because of their substantive 
leanings, not because of their weak or incorrect judicial method that they deploy; the 
decisions in Donoghue or Rylands are not right or wrong because of the formal merit of their 
judicial techniques, but because of the lasting appeal of their substantive politics. 30 
Contrary to what mainstream jurists believe, formal method cannot save the law and 
judges from themselves. Nor, if such techniques are followed, will judges be able to 
distinguish right decisions from wrong decision, not only as a matter of morality, but of 
law. Judgment is a substantive instinct that can never be applied in any easy or 
uncontroversial way: what is and is not useful will change as the circumstances and 
context shift. 
 
ON THE ASCENT 
 
Despite the wishes of contemporary jurists, there is no difference in character or authority 
that distinguishes philosophical or jurisprudential debate from any other kind of debate: the 
standards for judging the merits of particular arguments are part of that debate, not apart 
 
from it. For instance, although Dworkin contrasts moral and aesthetic disagreement, his 
account of how aesthetic debate proceeds is a fair explanation of how moral and 
jurisprudential engagement takes place. In discussing whether Picasso was a greater artist 
than Braque, Dworkin states that: 
'though Braque was a very important artist, all things considered Picasso was a greater 
one. Ifyou challenge me, I will try to sustain that opinion in various ways -by pointing 
to Picasso's greater originality, inventiveness, and range of qualities from playfulness 
to profundity, while nevertheless admitting certain advantage in Braque's work: a 
more lyrical approach to cubism, for example. Because artistic merit is a complex 
subject and my claim is an all things-considered one, the issue can tolerate a complex 
discussion. The conversation would not soon tum silly, as it would if l were trying to 
defend a claim about the greater nobility of Petrus compared with Lafite. I might or 
might not convince you, after sustained discussion, that I am right about Picasso 
and Braque; you might or might not convince me that I am wrong. But if neither 
convinces the other, I will continue in my opinion, as no doubt you will in yours. It 
would tell against my view that I could not convince you of it, but I would not count 
this as a refutation.' 31 
 
This kind of exchange in which the standards of assessment -greater originality, 
inventiveness, and range of qualities from playfulness to profundity are part and parcel of 
the debate is not dissimilar to moral or jurisprudential debate. Although the standards are 
of a different kind -freedom, solidarity and justice, for example and there is a constant 
hankering after more compelling or objective standards, there are none. There is no 
difference between what we honestly believe to be the case or right and what actually is 
right or the case. And the belief that there is such a difference is simply one more belief. To 
take such a stance is not to say that aesthetics and morals are the same or that morals is only 
as important as aesthetics. But it is to say that there is no killer-argument that can claim its 
authority from somewhere outside the human and situated debate that constitutes morals and 
 
aesthetics: authority is where you find it and, where you find it, is here-and-now, not in 
some imagined other-world. However, in the same way that Dworkin accurately captures the 
quality of both aesthetic and moral debate in talking about whether Picasso was a greater 
painter than Braque, he also showcases the fundamental mistake that Casaubonic theorists 
make when they tum to debate whether Picasso is a greater genius than Beethoven: 
'But if I were asked whether Picasso was greater genius that Beethoven, my answer 
would be very different. I would deny both that one was greater than the other and that 
they were exactly equal in merit. Picasso and Beethoven were both very great artists, I 
would say, and no exact comparison can be made between the two. Of course I must 
defend the distinction I have now drawn. Why can I rank Picasso and Braque, but not 
Picasso and Beethoven? The difference is not that people agree about standards for 
comparing artists in the same period or in the same genre. They don't, and it would not 
follow that the agreed standards were the right ones even if they did. The difference 
cannot be based on any cultural or social fact of that sort, but must be based, if it makes 
sense at all, on more general, perhaps even quite theoretical, assumptions about the 
character of artistic achievement or evaluation. I would try to defend my judgment about 
Picasso and Beethoven in that way. I believe that artistic achievement can only be 
measured as a response to artistic situation and tradition and that only order-of-
magnitude discriminations can be made across such traditions and genres. So though I do 
thi nk that Shakespeare was a greater creative artist than Vivaldi, I believe no precise 
ranking makes sense among evident geniuses at the very highest levels of different 
genres. This is not an evidently stable view, and I might well change my mind. But it is 
the view I now hold.' 32 
For all the good sense that Dworkin makes in his earlier account of aesthetic 
disagreement, this explanation of 'genius' bears all the unnecessary and unconvincing 
diversions of a Casaubonic mentality ahistorical, abstract and schematic. He maintains 
that it is only possible to be 'theoretical' if one escapes the bounds of 'cultural and social' 
context and seeks to transcend 'traditions and genres'. In contrast to his earlier emphasis on 
 
situated standards and engaged persuasion, Dworkin has once again entered on a 
justificatory ascent toward some super-human realm where truth, objectivity and, 
therefore, authority are the reward of those who best ape the gods. In contrast, I insist 




about ascending higher to some there-and-then, but about coming to terms with where we are 
in the here-and-now. 
Accordingly, once stripped of their philosophical paraphernalia, recherche juristic 
theories are revealed as a another political and partisan intervention. The claim that all that 
is done in the name of black-letterism, whether doctrinal or theoretical, is and can be done 
in a technical and non-ideological way is no more convincing today than it ever has been. 
Under cover of this apparently modest and apolitical intellectualised approach, there is a 
very real set of substantive biases in play; what is claimed to pass for philosophical 
rigour in the name of coherence and intelligibility is really a barely disguised effort to 
maintain and defend the status quo. In the same way that the immediate popularity and 
lasting appeal of Blackstone's Commentaries owed as much to the ideological leanings of 
its author as to its intellectual excellence, so the contributions of today's leading scholars 
to synthesise the law into a comprehensive and systematic body of rules and principles are 
neither neutral, objective nor detached. 33 It is not that there is a vast and overt conspiracy 
in play, bu t that the naive craf t commitments of the mainstream academic community are 
much less benign than many members realise or choose to recognise. However, the 
complacent assumption that the law is, by its nature as law, good and that this goodness will 
be enhanced in proportion to its increasing internal coherence and formal intel ligibility 
wears extremely thin in light of much evidence to the contrary: the camel is no animal for 
legal academics to emulate and sand is a poor building material for law schools. As Pierre 
Schlag concisely puts it, 'the progressive fallacy is the bel ief that the aspects of a practice 
 
. . . that are "good" are constitutive or essential to the practice, while those aspects of the 
practice that are "bad" are merely by-products of or contingent to the practice' .34 
In short, black-letterism works as a convenient mode of denial. It enables legal 
academics and lawyers to engage in what is a highly political and contested arena of social 
life namely, law and to pretend that they are doing so in a largely non-political way. 
The main advantage of this is that they can go about their daily routines without assuming 
any political or personal responsibility for what happens in the legal process. However, 
the insistence that lawyering is a neutral exercise that does not implicate lawyers in 
any political process or demand from scholars a commitment to any particular ideology 
is as weak as it is deceptive. Such a Casaubonic-like image is a profoundly conservative 
and crude understanding of what it is to engage in the business of courts, legislatures and 
the like: it accepts and works within the bounds of the status quo. Lawyers tend to confuse 
legal justice with social fairness. Indeed, the power and prestige of lawyers flow from 
their professional allegiance to the state's official laws and existi ng institutions; 
lawyers as a group, in spite of the efforts of many individual lawyers, are the enlisted 
custodians of the status quo. By pretending otherwise and renouncing responsibility for 
the system that their actions hold in place, lawyers and academics are able to maintain their 
so-called independence and apolitical authority. The black-letter tradition of legal 
scholarship is in the business of producing political tracts as much as the politician and 
polemicist; the fact that they are presented and styled in the opaque jargon of professional 
disinterest and technical expertise serves to compound the disingenuity. As such, black-
letterism is an ideology in the profoundest sense of the world in that it presents a 
particular and partial view of the world as neutral and natural. 
None the less, not all the critics of a Casaubon-style legal theorising share the same 
complaint or pursue the same cause. Even self-described pragmatists pursue their 
pragmatism in the most unpragmatic of ways. There is a growing band of anti-theorists 
who are merciless in their critique of the kind of grand Casaubonic theorising in which 
Dworkin, Weinrib and others engage. For instance, Richard Posner insists that moral 
 
theory not only has little to offer law, but that it is positively dangerous to it; it draws 
judges and jurists off into the kind of ideological and indeterminate speculation that is 
inimical to legitimate lawyering. For Posner, this does not mean that law must be 
unprincipled or technocratic, only that it is wrong to equate 'moral principle to principle, 
and morality to normativity'. Instead, he concludes that what is required is that judges 
develop 'a disposition to ground policy judgments on facts and consequences than on 
conceptualisms and generalities': judges and lawyers must eschew philosophy for 
social science. However, this audacious proposal that the empirical tools of economists 
are morally neutral and ought to be adopted by judges is no less hubristic in its own 
rationales and recommendations. Indeed, Richard Posner manages to out-Casaubon 
Dworkin; he simply wants to replace moral philosophy with social science. While it is 
true that judges and jurists would do well to take greater heed of the socio-political 
context in which they work and of the actual consequences of their decisions and 
suggestions, it is absurd to imagine that this can be done without some resort to social 
values or political commitments. As an empirical matter, it is simply not the case that 
there is 'a fair degree of value consensus among the judges', such that they can 'seek the 
best results unhampered by philosophical doubts' .35 As I have been at pains to 
demonstrate, what theory cannot do is provide a method, be it moral or scientific, that will 
relieve people from the responsibility and challenge of constantly arguing and re-
arguing what should and should not be done in particular contexts at particular times. 
It was Justice Brandeis' prediction that little progress in society will made until the 
lawyers' obsession with 'the logic of words' has been healed by their attachment to the 
'logic of realities'. 36 However, in emphasising that law's development is better 
explained as a contingent responsiveness to historical circumstances than as the 
unfolding of law's inner logic, I ought not to be taken to be making the very different claim 
that law develops in line with some external deep-logic of social reality it is 'logic' as 
much as the words or the realities that is the problem. There is no one account of the 
organic relation between law and social relations that is valid for all time, all societies 
 
and all legal developments. The connections between legal doctrine and material interests 
are often as casual as they are causal and as contingent as they are necessary. It is not that 
legal doctrine is without any rhythm or reason at all, but that any efforts to go beyond either 
the most general or the most detailed account are confounded by the doctrinal and social 
facts; the explanations become either so abstract as to lack any practical predictive force or so 
elaborate as to capture only a particular historical moment in time. There are always too many 
plausible and competing rationales to satisfy the Casaubonic need for explanatory primacy 
or closure. In the same way that E P Thompson announced that 'the greatest of all fictions is 
that the law evolves, from case to case, by its own impartial logic, true only to its own integrity, 
unswayed by expedient considerations' ,37 the reverse can be proclaimed with equal force -law 
does not evolve, from case to case, by the partial logic of class struggle, true only to 
established interests, unswayed by logical considerations. By different measures at different 
times, the development of law is a mix of the logical -in the sense of attempted compliance 
with law's own generated (and indeterminate) rationality and the expedient in the sense of 
responsiveness to society's own political (and indeterminate) demands. Both logic and 
expediency infiltrate and affect the operation of each other; lawyers and judges are neither 
only the lackey of established (or any other) interests nor always the intellectual captives 
of a professional tradition. Black-letterism sees only the logical and, when it does see the 
expedient, it seeks to avert its eyes or obliterate it. 
This all having been said, it is not my intention to condemn theory tout court. It should be 
clear that I am not against theory per se, but only its continued and exclusive Casaubonic 
self-image: a sophisticated anti-theory is not same as a vulgar anti-theoreticism or a crude 
practicalism. I am against grand-theory and theoreticism, not theory or philosophy. If 
philosophers are to be of use to societies that claim or aspire to democratic ideals, they 
must abandon the belief that their task must be to lay down authoritative blueprints for legal 
and political action in the name of some universal truth about the human condition or law. 
It is not only possible, but more effective to talk about politics and morality without a 
commitment to a theory of objective truths; an emancipatory or transformative project does 
 
not depend on or require a grand theory to back it up. In the same way that there is no 
sharp break between theory and practice, so there is no gap between law and politics or 
between jurisprudence and practical lawyering; it is not that each collapse into each other 
and have no relevant differences, it is simply that there is no fixed and clear line dividing 
one from the other that is not itself hostage to the context in which it arises and is sustained. 
In an important sense, it is more theory that is need, not Jess. As such, I agree with 
Dworkin that 'we have no choice but to ask [judges and lawyers] to confront issues that, 
from time to time, are philosophical' . However, I also maintain that such 
philosophical work need not and must not be of the Casaubonic variety; Dworkin's 
jurisprudence does not so m uch abandon 'all the familiar legal phlogistons', as he 
claims, but in its attachment to integrity, truth and objectivity adds to that alchemical 
collection.38 Instead, what is required is a more useful jurisprudence. In the end, there 
must be talk about substance without the distracting diversion of theory talk. But not, 
as Posner insists, as an exercise without values and not, as Dworkin and his Casaubonic 
colleagues insist, as a matter of grand theorising. It is to a more useful account of legal 
theory that I now tum, one that can lead to 'large vistas and wide fresh air' rather than 
'anterooms and winding passages which seem to lead nowhither'. 39 
 
TOWARD A USEFUL JURISPRUDENCE 
 
After Casaubon' s demise, Dorothea struggled to come to terms with the meaning of his death 
for her life. Not helped by Casaubon's vengeful will (which made her inheritance 
conditional on not marrying Will Lad islaw, a young, if headstrong admirer), it took her a long 
time to break free of his chilling influence. Moreover, it took even longer for her to confound 
people's opinion that, despite her reputed cleverness, she had thrown herself 'at Mr 
Casaubon's feet and kissing his unfashionable shoe-ties as if he were a Protestant Pope'. 
Although she never subscribed to the uncharitable view that he was 'a cursed white-blooded 
pedantic coxcomb', she did recognise the false allure of Casaubon's scholarly pretension: 
 
'And Dorothea had so often had to check her weariness and impatience over this 
questionable riddle-guessing, as it revealed itself to her instead of the fellowship in high 
knowledge which was to make life worthier.' Dorothea intuited that intelligible and 
responsible action was not a gift from the gods or a result of allegiance to a priori truths 
about fixed principles; it was to be achieved in and through a social practice that interrogates 
standards of action as it formulates them. Moving from the parochial Middlemarch to a 
cosmopolitan London and marrying the free-spirited Will, she ended her days in 'a life 
filled with a beneficent activity'. Although she did not engage in grand projects, 'the effect 
of her being on those around her was incalculably diffuse; for the growing good of the world 
is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as 
they might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and 
rest in unvisited tombs' .40 
Legal theorists would do well to imitate Dorothea's humility: the self-image of legal 
theorists as privileged purveyors of special knowledge and as peripatetic traders in eternal 
verities must be abandoned. As practised in the grand tradition, jurisprudence ought to have 
no particular authority or priority over democratic deliberation. In place of Casaubonic 
conceit, there is a definite need to give a more sustained and sympathetic account of 
'Dorothea's complaint' and its implications for the practice of law and legal theorising. 
While most lawyers and legal theorists are still prepared, through a combination of 
intellectual naivety, institutional allegiance and political advantage, to buy into the possible 
realisation of jurisprudence's philosophical project or, at least, to tolerate it as a noble 
undertaking, a number of critics refuse to accept such a pretence. True to the Dorothean 
spirit of progressive transformation through more humble doings, they realise that traditional 
philosophical peregrinations not only lead 'nowither', but that more is to be achieved by 
practical and unpretentious interventions than by grand and arcane gestures. Indeed, rather 
than perpetuate popular enthraldom to the cause of Philosophical Enlightenment, the need 
for there to be critical disenchantment in the name of democratic empowerment is fully 
recognised. When viewed in these terms, the pressing question of how people should live 
 
or think about law becomes not a methodological puzzle of abstract dimensions, but a 
substantive challenge of historical proportions. There is neither universal Truth nor supra-
historical Knowledge, but only the human effort to do the best that we can with full range 
of human resources at our disposal. And this first demands a switch in jurisprudential 
attention from the pursuit of metaphysical truth to the practice of political usefulness a 
juristic account or proposal is mistaken not because it is philosophically wrong, but because 
it is not practically useful. 
In adumbrating this different approach to the jurisprudential task, the first thing to 
clear up is the allegation that the anti-Casaubonic perspective that I am proposing is 
somehow the equivalent of a nihilist or relativist stance in which all values and proposals 
are as good (or bad) as any other. This is nonsense and says more about mainstream jurists 
and their inability to get beyond their own limited and limiting understandings. For 
them, there is no choice other than objectivity or subjectivity; anything that does not 
live up to the objective standards of truth is mere conviction, convention, ideology, etc. 
This is exactly the Casaubonic kind of either/or, all-or-nothing thinking that is to be 
resisted; there are more possibilities than objective truth 'a matter of how things really are' 
or subjective opinion 'in our own breasts' .41  To be against objective truth does not mean 
that one is left with only subjective opinion and to be against only subjective opinion does 
not imply that one is defending the existence of objective truth. It is arrant nonsense to 
insist that the loss of objectivity in the transcendent sense means that all interpretations 
are subjective and all truths are relative. It is entirely possible and reasonable to insist 
that, although the traditional search for objectivity is a lost cause, there are not only 
subjective opinions and relativised truths. Instead, one truth is not as good as another if 
one understands by truth nothing more than that it meets the familiar procedures of 
justification that hold sway. As such, therefore, it is entirely mistaken to assert that 
pragmatists offer an account of truth that is based upon consensus in that what passes for truth 
is truth; the pragmatist does not have a relativistic theory of truth because the pragmatist has 
no theory of truth.42 There is no such thing as nihilism or relativism if the traditional idea of 
 
truth and objectivity is rejected; there are only better and worse views in advancing the 
substantive cause of political justice. Accordingly, dumping grand theory does not entail a 
resigned relativism in which each and every idea or claim is as good as any other. 
Pragmatists take the view that all cultures are not equal, but that all do have something to 
contribute to debate. Justification is a practice and what works will depend on the context 
in which justification is offered and heard. It is not about striving to reach a promised 
land of truth that will make further justification unnecessary. Instead, jurisprudence must 
become more useful such that success is not vouchsafed by reliance upon a particular 
epistemic method, but by the usefulness of the results arrived at and their effect upon 
meeting certain objectives that are taken to be morally or politically significant: 
'pragmatists see the charge of relativism as simply the charge that we see luck where 
our critics insist on seeing destiny.' Pragmatists, like Rorty, prefer hope over knowledge 
and insist that moral choice is 'always a matter of compromise between competing goods 
rather than a choice between the absolutely right and the absolutely wrong' .43 Instead of 
reflecting upon universality to justify particular principles, there should be talk about the 
concrete and relative advantages of choosing one over another in particular 
circumstances. There is only justification; it does not lead to nor is it underwritten by truth, 
but is to be judged by its contribution to democratic agreement and greater 
emancipation. In an important sense, therefore, the alternative to knowingness is not 
ignorance, but awe and wonder. And the alternative to theory is not practicalism, but 
romance and politics. By seeing itself as a tool which can be used to spark the 
imagination and create hope in people for the improvement of society, jurisprudence 
will become more useful and relevant, not less. 
In advocating a useful jurisprudence, I ought not to be taken as championing some fixed 
or foundational idea of usefulness that is intended to inform and guide practice. On the 
contrary, I want to ensure that this definitional effort is a integral part of the very 
argumentative culture that develops and allows transformations of what is and is not 
useful. This means that, 'instead of seeing progress as a matter of getting closer to 
 
something specifiable in advance, [pragmatists] see it as a matter of solving problems . . . 
[and] it is measured by the extent to which we have made ourselves better than we were 
in the past rather than by our increased proximity to a goal' .44 Consequently, the 
emphasis on usefulness is not another disguised strategy of Casaubonic theorising in 
which usefulness replaces integrity or purity as the underlying standard of jurisprudential 
worth. In moving from truth to usefulness, a pragmatic jurisprudence does not set out to 
know things as they really are or to isolate a universal criterion of usefulness. Because 
usefulness is a continually contested and contextualised yardstick, it begs to be judged 
by its contribution to the ambitious project of challenging the present arrangements in 
order to improve the future. To do this, jurisprudence requires a different vocabulary more 
suited to its practical demands. There must be less formal talk of integrity, consistency and 
harmony and more substantive talk of justice, well-being and empowerment. Although 
pragmatism cannot answer the compelling question of what to do next? in any fixed or 
certain way, it can encourage the jurisprudential effort to ensure that valuable energies 
are not wasted on pseudo-debates about truth and objectivity. In doing so, it will become 
possible to open a space in which people can engage directly about what is more and less 
useful in specific contexts at specific times. 
In pursuing this useful agenda of jurisprudential study, mainstream theorists still have a 
possible role to play and contribution to make. A demonstration that Dworkin's or 
Weinrib's ideals do not flow inexorably from the law does not, of course, dispense 
entirely with their claim on our ju risprudential attention. While it robs them of their 
claimed authority as objective truths, their proposals must still be judged as another 
contingent proposal for making sense of the world and the possibilities for its remaki ng. 
Consequently, their work still has value provided that its insights are treated as 
rhetorical interventions in a continuing democratic conversation, not as authoritative 
conversation-stoppers regarding eternal verities. Once such jurists ditch their 
metaphysical baggage, not only might they get to their chosen destination quicker, but 
they might accept that, as well as there being several approaches, the destination will 
 
change as events move on. Dworkin, Weinrib, Posner and others should engage in a 
justificatory descent that will bring them down-toearth so that they will talk more 
about unemployment, racism, poverty, and the like. If there is agreement on the 
problems (and, for instance, Dworkin and Rorty share much more in their vision of a 
better world than they disagree upon), then more time can be spent on their practical 
resolution than on pseudodisputes about philosophical niceties. If there is disagreement, it 
will not help much to take time out and argue about abstract notions of truth and 
objectivity. Even if there was agreement abou t such matters, it has no necessary 
consequences for the more crucial efforts to improve the quality of people's lives. 
Instead, it is more productive to unpack and identify what is shared and to work to 
persuade each other how best to go forward as part of a common commitment to 
improve society. 
One way to advance that useful agenda is to treat the courts and common law as 
venues for the resolution of concrete disputes rather than as the site for the philosophical 
elaboration of doctrinal integrity or purity. This will demand a shift in jurisprudential 
emphasis from the law-making focus of judges to their problem-solving capacity. Indeed, 
despite their protestations to the contrary, Dworkin and his Casaubonic colleagues do not 
take law seriously. By asking judges to be open to 'justificatory ascent' and thereby 
turning them into grand theorists, they neglect the pragmatic strengths of the common 
law and reduce politics to an abstract pursuit. The potential strength of the common law 
is its practicality and situatedness: the courts must concentrate more on practical 
solutions to practical problems than on philosophical responses to philosophical problems. 
Like Dorothea, judges achieve the greatest fulfilment of their institutional 
responsibility when they work toward 'a life filled with a beneficent activity' rather than 
when they aspire to 'the fellowship in high knowledge'. In proposing this juristic 
realignment, I do not want to be taken as suggesting that the common law has been or 
necessarily will be the perfect complement to the kind of useful approach to jurisprudence 
that I have been advocating. However, I do maintain that, when viewed from such a 
 
pragmatic perspective, the common law has all the possibilities to become an 
institutional site for the kind of experimental, contextualised and practical interventions 
that I support. While the history of the common law ought not to impress the critics' 
sensibilities, it does not mean that resort to the courts is a hopeless or counter-
productive diversion. Because the present is the only place to begin in making a better future, 
it is appropriate to utilise existing institutional arrangements at the same time that one 
works to effect their transformation in line with a more progressive and emancipatory 
ideal.45  To allow the ideal future to be the enemy of the flawed present is a recipe for 
resignation and complicity, not action and change. Ideological purity is no more 
attractive or useful than its philosophical relative. Within such a re-visioning of the 
common law, jurists and legal scholars can play a number of roles. Foremost among them, 
any study of law or ethics must not, as black-letterism proposes, be done without recognising 
the political context and conditions of that undertaking: the resilient black-letter practice 
of decontextualisation must be strenuously combated. Instead, there has to be a greater 
recognition that law and politics are intimately and inseparably related; it is futile and 
well-nigh fraudulent to study one without the other. However, the study of politics and its 
relationship to law is not enough in itself. That study must be done in such a way that 
avoids the pitfalls and problems of blackletterism.  There is little point in examining 
law's political context and determinants if it is done within the capacious reach, but 
narrowing influence of a Casaubonic mind-set. To demand anything less is to allow the 
lingering spirit of black-letterism to intoxicate people into believing that clear directions 
and speedy routes can be mapped onto the messy and changing terrain of ethical and 
political inquiry, especially in mapping and exploring the relation of law and politics. 
Although the useful kind of legal scholarship recommended is scarce, it is not entirely 
absent: there is exciting work being done by -and this should come as no surprise -women 
and people of colour. For every Smith and Hogan, there is a Lacey and Wells; for every, 
Treitel and Beatson, there is a Wheeler and Shaw; and for every Salmond and Street, there is a 
Conaghan and Mansell. For instance, in contrast to Smith and Hogan's scholarship, the work 
 
of Nicola Lacey and Celia Wells is a breath of fresh air: they are truly inter-disciplinary, they 
make explicit their operative assumptions, they move socially-relevant issues from margin 
to centre, and their focus is theoretical in the best practical sense.46 
However, as a complement (and a compliment) to the work of such legal scholars, 
jurists can also play an explicitly and suitably theoretical role. Apart from tackling the 
lingering influence and Casaubonic practice of mainstream theory, they can bring fresh 
insights and appreciations to jurisprudence. In particular, jurists can develop alternative 
modes of discourse, so that philosophy will become more a discourse of dissent than a 
monologue of reverence. Rather than draft grand schema for political or legal action under 
the authority of some alleged universal truth, philosophers can seek out new possibilities 
and alternative openings. By cultivating 'the ability to redescribe the familiar in unfamiliar 
terms' ,47 such useful theorists can help dislodge the deep-seated belief that present socio-
historical arrangements are inevitable and frozen in place. They can reassure people that, 
once epistemology has lost authority, mob rule will not fill the theoretical void. But 
empowered citizens might and, in doing so, can begin to claim authority over their own 
lives and participate more effectively in the civic elaboration of situated truths. By being 
activist in imagination and commitment, pragmatists will come to recognise that their 
philosophical task is to be as much inspired poets as robust political operatives. Or, to put 
it another way, jurists will recognise that the best way to do legal philosophy is to do it 
pragmatically, usefully and poetically. The persistent belief that 'law is the calling of 
thinkers', whether in the form of metaphysicians or economists, and 'not the place for the 
artist or the poet' is to discarded once and for all.48 Like all the other Casaubonic 
distinctions, the difference between art and science or literature and philosophy is one of 
emphasis and practice, not essence and theory. In becoming artists and poets, jurists and 
legal scholars can become better thinkers. 
 
A RADICAL TURN 
 
 
As will be obvious to anyone vaguely familiar with the contemporary jurisprudential 
scene, pragmatism has become very much the de rigeur intellectual fashion of the day. 
While it is not quite accurate to say that jurists have adopted the slogan that 'we are all 
pragmatists now', there is a definite desire on the part of many jurists to be identified with 
the pragmatic turn in legal theory. In many ways, this is an encouraging trend. But, on 
closer inspection, it becomes clear that these conversions are more superficial than real, 
more a simple change of clothes than a substantial transformation of life-style. Many of 
those who call themselves pragmatists have done little more than incorporate pragmatic 
phrasings and vocabulary into their jurisprudential writings; they still subscribe to the same 
Casaubonic understanding of the jurisprudential project and what would count as its 
successful completion. In short, they practice pragmatism in the most unpragmatic of 
ways and deploy pragmatic means for distinctly unpragmatic ends. Accordingly, it is 
necessary to chart and criticise the different forms of jurisprudential pragmatism in terms 
of their willingness to pursue the full implications of a pragmatic sensibility. There seem to 
be three possible groupings conservative, liberal and radical.49 Whereas the first two hedge 
on the implications of a pragmatic critique, the third carries through that critique in the 
most uncompromising way. However, while I support a radical pragmatism, I do not do so 
as the best or only form of pragmatic jurisprudence - that would smack too much of a 
Casaubonic standard. Instead, I do so because it is the most useful and effective possibility 
for improving the lot of those most disadvantaged and disenfranchised in society. The three 
kinds of pragmatism can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Conservative pragmatism is conservative because, as the name implies, it accepts 
much of the contextual situation as given; there is no willingness to disturb present 
arrangements. In jurisprudence, conservative pragmatists propose a pragmatic mode of 
legal reasoning that rejects the theoretical pretensions of the Casaubonic grand-
theorists and treasures the virtues of technical craft and particularised judgment. While 
its practitioners make all the right noises,50 their accounts remain profoundly abstruse 
 
and rationalistic in the sense that they are unsituated in the material circumstances of 
history and inured to their political dynamics: 'abstract universality' is ditched, but only 
to be replaced by 'abstract particularity'. There is little appreciation that legal reasoning 
operates in the real world of historical struggle or of how law does (and does not) 
change. The only experience and context that matters is the legal one: the experience of 
the law is the life of its own logic. 
• Liberal pragmatism is much less insulated and contained than conservative 
pragmatism. The whole idea and force of contingency is given much greater 
recognition. Stepping outside the hermetic world of legal experience, scholars 
look to legal reasoning as a much more constructed and contextualised practice. 
Under this view, law and jurisprudence are a language game that people play with 
greater or lesser facility; it is as much a matter of coping as it is getting it right. 
Although many follow the conventional script, some struggle to escape from 
inherited descriptions and to offer fresh discursive options. As such, truth and 
objectivity are ethical practices that are not about 'the accurate representation of 
something nonhuman', but 'a matter of intersubjective consensus among human 
beings' .51 As an ethical ideal, transformation and emancipation are treated as more a 
personal undertaking than a social project; the emphasis is on private irony than public 
reconstruction. 
• Last, but not least, there is radical pragmatism. In contrast to both conservative and 
liberal pragmatism, it does not hedge on the subversive implications of the anti-
essentialist insight. In a manner of speaking, radical pragmatism is radical because it 
accepts that it is pragmatism all the way down: there is no artificial distinction between 
what is and is not up for grabs. Because everything has been constructed, everything can 
be deconstructed and reconstructed: if conservative pragmatism ignores both history 
and politics, liberal pragmatism has succeeded in placing present arrangements in an 
historical context, only to fail to politicise that history; liberal pragmatism tends to 
apprehend more benign and accidental forces at work in social life than is the case. In 
 
law, this means that legal reasoning is as much about political oppression as it is 
about ethical consensus. 52 The liberal pragmatists' failure to appreciate adequately the 
grubby, materialistic and public conditions under which private efforts at self-
realisation take place make their notion of political struggle too clinical, intellectual, 
and individualistic. 
Accordingly, by refusing to duck the corrosive consequences of a thoroughgoing 
pragmatism, the radical version ensures that what amounts to a useful politics or 
jurisprudence is opened up to the widest range of possible options and, most 
importantly, to the widest range of participants. By giving the idea of social practices a 
more political than ethical spin, it brings the operation of power into the centre of debate; 
consensus (and, therefore, standards of persuasion and justification) can be treated as 
imposed as much as chosen. Careful not to slip back into a discredited version of 
ideological suffocation, such a radical pragmatism can thereby work towards ensuring that 
those voices presently left out of democracy's sustaining conversation are included and 
able to articulate for themselves what is and is not useful. I say 'for themselves' because 
it is the lingering influence of a Casaubonic h ubris that mistakenly suggests that the 
educated and wise can speak best for the dispossessed: public and local efforts at 
transformation must be undertaken to permit the disenfranchised to speak in their own 
voices, with their own vocabulary and through their own visions about usefulness. Nor 
should the voices of the presently excluded be valorised or given authority simply by 
virtue of their excludedness; democracy demands neither the demonisation nor the 
romanticisation of the oppressed. Moreover, as well as broadening and substantiating 
the popular franchise, there must be equally vigorous efforts to multiply and transform the 
institutions in which such debate and struggle occur. A radical society is not one that has a 
fixed idea of usefulness or a set inventory of institutional opportunities for its elaboration; 
it is one in which the idea and institutions of usefulness are themselves being constantly 
revisited and revised. There is nothing about this plea for such a robustly democratic 
society which depends on any philosophical claim that such a society is more natural, 
 
more rational, more coherent, more pure or more anything else than any other society. On 
the contrary, it is simply a substantive argument that such a society is best suited to ensure 
the emancipation of people from suffering and deprivation. As a political proposal, it is 
defended and espoused in the name of usefulness, not truth. 
In this radical view of pragmatism, the democratic ideal of a 'free and open encounter' 
about values and commitments is to be encouraged, but that 'freedom' and 'openness' cannot 
be understood outside some context of power and politics.53 While there is no truth or 
reason to set over against power or politics, it does not follow that one simply collapses 
into the other. Those critics who argue that reason is only power are as mistaken as those 
who argue that reason and power can be totally insulated from each other. Although truth 
and reason are always located within a context of power and politics, the possibility of 
maintaining standards of justification and persuasion is not thereby sabotaged entirely. 
Rather than attempt the impossible by seeking to establish standards that are pure and 
undistorted by power, efforts should be taken to make standards more shared and to include 
the widest possible diversity of voices in their social construction; the claim to establish 
neutral or objective standards is fated to reflect the ideas, no matter how well-intentioned, of 
a select few. Indeed, because 'judgments of merit are inevitably culturally and 
ideologically contingent' ,54 an unbiased standard is simply one that does not favour one 
group over other; it is not one that is supposedly based on no values at all. Indeed, the 
problem is not the intervention of power in the halls of reason, but the traditional belief 
that power can be somehow excluded and that there exists some non-cultural and non-
social standard of merit. The democratic ambition is not to ensure that reason is detached 
from value or power, but that the values and interests that help constitute reason represent 
and are conducive to a truly democratic society. The debate must be about what counts as 
reason and merit and what standards are most useful to a democratic society. Accordingly, 
a meritocratic ideal is not anti-democratic, provided that what is understood as meritorious 
is a situated and substantive assessment, not a formal and far-fetched one. 
In a similar vein, a radical brand of pragmatism insists that, although any 
 
accommodation to the status quo is not required, nor is a root-and-branch rejection. Being 
opportunistic rather than doctrinaire, those committed to significant transformation should 
be prepared to use whatever resources are available to them. On the basis that no strategy 
has any necessary or inevitable consequences, but will depend on the particular context in 
which it is utilised, radicals should be prepared to draw on the conservative and liberal 
repertoire to advance the cause of democratic empowerment. Accordingly, while the courts 
have been a privileged site for defending the status quo and the history of the common 
law is more reactionary than revolutionary, radical pragmatist should countenance 
litigation as a possible tool for social change if or when the local conditions are 
propitious. In short, because everything is constructed, it does not mean that everything 
has to be deconstructed or reconstructed all at once: the fact that everything is up for grabs 
does not demand that everything be 'up' or grabbed at the same time. 
Finally, it is instructive to deal with a particular and telling criticism that might be made 
against 'useful jurisprudence' and my radical version of it. An important charge is likely to 
be that, although I urge a more useful performance of the jurisprudential craft, I am 
engaged in exactly the same kind of indulgent word-mongering that is typical of the 
Casaubonic mind-set. Withdrawn form the real-world, I am long on words and short on 
action how many more people will be off the streets and in better accommodation as a 
result of this essay? To phrase this objection in terms of Middlemarch, it would seem that 
what separates Dorothea from Casaubon is not her philosophical commitments, but her 
commitment to abandon philosophy entirely and simply dedicate herself to action. 
Moreover, juristic Dorothea wannabees, like me, run the real risk of befalling the same 
fate as the emulous Dr Lydgate. One of the new breed of professionals, he arrives in 
Middlemarch with grand ambitions of changing the face of traditional medicine and 
establishing a modem hospital for the poor. However, spumed by the establishment and 
mismatched to an extravagant wife, Lydgate takes a loan from the unscrupulous Bulstrode, 
a wealthy landowner, which embroils him in a series of social and legal fiascoes. Unable 
to recover from the ensuing disgrace, Lydgate ends his days as a physician who practices 
 
the very kind of medicine that he originally wanted to revolutionise and who toadies to 
the very elite that he originally despised. Whereas Dorothea acts on her disenchantment and 
abandons entirely the hypocrisy of genteel Middlemarch society, Lydgate succumbs to the 
blandishments of the social elite and, unable to beat them, joins them. 
I have three responses to this. The first is that there is much wisdom in this criticism, 
but its force is more cautionary than condemnatory. I cannot disagree that it would be better 
if there were more Dorotheas and less legal theorists: there are too few Dorotheas and too 
many Lydgates. However, this does not mean that legal theorists have no role to play at all, 
only that it should be a more humble and limited one which receives far less kudos than it 
presently does; Dorothea is a much better role model than Casaubon or Lydgate. This leads 
to my second response. As a legal theorist, I am doing something useful in that I am 
challenging the way that jurists and legal scholars tend to tum all practical problems into 
philosophical ones, thereby unhelpfully re-presenting them as abstract puzzles rather than 
substantive problems. In contrast, I urge those involved in legal study to abjure such flights 
of fancy and to keep their feet firmly on the social ground, even as that ground shifts and 
changes with time and circumstance; it is situation-sense that is best culti vated, not 
conceptual sophistication. For me, the hapless and pusillanimous Lydgate stands as an acute 
reminder of the need for both conviction and courage, without either of which co-optation 
and complicity seem inevitable. However, the obvious riposte to this defence is that being 
a legal theorist, of whatever colour or commitment, is the real problem. While Casaubonic 
theorising is to be deplored and Dorothean critique is to be preferred, Dorothean scholarship 
remains too close for comfort and is part of the same academic indulgence. Even if the talk is 
about usefulness, it remains only talk and ignores the main lesson of Dorothea's life that 
it is better to live 'a life filled with beneficent activity' than talk about living one; good 
intentions do little in themselves to alleviate suffering and cruelty. This is a stiff challenge 
and must be confronted directly. 
My third and more fundamental response, therefore, is to return to the basic thrust of a 
radical pragmatism and, in particular, its opposition to Casaubonic thinking. The insistence 
 
upon a hard-and-fast distinction between talk and actions is not as real or as compelling as 
some might think. Moreover, it is made no less palatable because it is deployed in the service 
of a more progressive agenda. Such a contrast between words and acts, like all other 
distinctions (ie theory and practice, law and politics, etc), is difficult to maintain and smacks of 
a lingering Casaubonic influence. Indeed, to treat talk and action as conceptually distinct is a 
hallmark of the kind of thinking that this essay has sought to discredit. The practical power of 
ideas or talk is not something to be underestimated. After all, it was talk and ideas that 
contributed to Dorothea's epiphany. Moreover, on the broader canvas of social history, it is talk 
of ideas as much as acts of force that hold oppressive regimes in place and can contribute to 
their downfall: both Vorster and Mandela as well as Hitler and Churchill testify to that. 
What is a problem and what one should do about it implicates some theory and, similarly, 
what tells you to act instead of only talk is itself a theory. Of course, what I mean by theory is 
not something to be set over against or above practice, but is part and parcel of the same 
enterprise. In a manner of speaking, talk is an act that, while it might not be as immediate 
or as obvious as other acts, is as necessary to what we do as anything else. Just as there are 
better and worse ways of acting, so there are better and worse ways of talking. Accordingly, 
there is no one way to challenge injustice; it takes many people doing many different things at 
many different times and in many different ways. Doing legal theory is one of those ways, 
no intrinsically better and no worse than any other ambition. But, as this essay has sought to 
argue, there are better and worse ways of doing legal theory a Dorothean perspective is 
more useful than a Casaubonic approach. Theory is an act that makes possible other acts or, 
to put it more pragmatically, theory is itself a contextualised practice which is also one of the 
contexts within which acts take on shape and substance: theory's success at doing that will 
be a measure of its usefulness and such a measure will be situated and substantive, not 
abstract and conceptual. And talking with a Casaubonic accent is a way of doing things that 




GIVING UP THE GHOST 
 
Years before Nietzsche's apocalyptic obituary, James Mill confided to his more famous 
son that 'there is no God, but this is a family secret'. Yet, over l 00 years later, the 
announcement that God is dead remains as controversial today as it ever was; its impact 
on the world of jurists and jurisprudence is still being felt and resisted. Indeed, a reader 
of much modern legal scholarship and jurisprudence could be forgiven for thinking 
that there is still a conspiracy of silence within the Law and Legal Philosophy family. 
In so far as the announcement was intended to disabuse belief in a standard of 
instruction or guidance in regulation of human conduct that could be drawn from 
outside humanity, lawyers and jurists long ago grasped that law did not represent God's 
design or direction. It was conceded that law was essentially a human artefact; it could 
never amount to much more (and was often much less) than a flawed distillation of 
divine wisdom. None the less, while lawyerliness might no longer be next to godliness, 
dreams of hubris still fire the jurisprudential imagination. Despite protestations to the 
contrary, contemporary lawyers and legal theorists have fulfilled Nietzsche's subsequent 
prediction that 'given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in 
which [the Deceased's] shadow will be shown' .55 Jurisprudence is one of those enclaves 
where such spectral deities still roam and where its practitioners still aspire to 
mediate divine intimations. Committed to a continuation of the black-letter project, 
legal academics and jurists do not seem able to give up the Casaubonic ghost. 
Rather than treat God's death as an opportunity to seize the democratic initiative, some 
philosophers and jurists have interpreted it as an invitation to tum themselves into gods. 
Yet there is no Coherent Truth or Objective Integrity that inheres and endures in the heavens, 
humanity's essential nature or the general scheme of things. And it most certainly cannot be 
divined from the erstwhile musings of jurists and judges across space and time. As a 
thoroughly human and thus flawed artefact, law has little or no qualitative dimension that 
transcends its quantitative mass. In the struggle for social justice, philosophical hubris is 
 
not to be preferred over democratic humility. If lawyers and jurists are to help society 
make good on itself, they must resist the temptation to pay homage to the dubious deities 
of Truth and Objectivity. And they most certainly must resist the temptation to treat 
democracy as a divinistic ritual or as its own god. Without God or other lesser deities, there 
need be neither chaos nor tyranny. On the contrary, exorcising the ghost of Casaubon can 
provide an opportunity for transformation and renewal. What it does not do is render all 
knowledge illusory, tum all truths into falsehoods, throw all order into chaos and reveal all 
objectivity as sham. This is a ghastly projection of the Casaubonic imagination and ought 
to have no more hold on our intellects than Casaubon himself. 
While it might be true that law and legal scholarship, like all stories, 'are haunted by 
the ghosts of the stories they might have been',56 law remains thoroughly spooked by the 
jurisprudential phantoms of what it could and should never be. A more appropriate 
response to such jurisprudential fantasising is not awe-induced toleration, but a defiant and 
decisive act of ghost-busting. The time has come to break free of all ghosts or, if that is 
not possible, to opt for ghosts that are more, not less conducive to a democratic 
imagination. When all is said and done, there are simply people, with all the frailties and 
possibilities that this entails, trying to make sense of themselves, the contingency of their 
situation, and the responsibility to make and re-make their own lives in the best way that 
they see fit. But there is no bargain, Faustian or otherwise, that can get us out of the 
continuing present to some redemptive future or forgiving past. The present is all that we 
have or will have and it is our responsibility to make it the best that it can be. So, what is 
it to be? Dorothea or Casaubon? The actual construction of cottages for the poor or 
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